情境的认知与学习的文化外文翻译资料

情境的认知与学习的文化

John Seely Brown, Allan Collins and Paul Duguid

摘要：许多教学实践含蓄地假设了概念性知识可以从学习和使用的情境中得到。这篇文章认为这种假设不可避免地限制了这种做法的有效性。结合近期的研究，作者认为知识具有情境，它是我们生活中活动、语境和文化的一部分，并且在日常活动中显现。他们在探讨这样的一种知识论将如何影响我们对学习的理解，并指出传统的学校教育往往忽略了学校文化对在学校所学知识的影响。作为替代传统练习的做法，他们提出了情境认知 （柯林斯，布朗，纽曼先后提出），其中将情境性知识提到了很重要的位置上。他们做了两个数学教学的范例来展示这种教学方式的主要特征。

学会和使用之间的差距，也就是广受民众认可的的 “知其然”和“知其所以然”，很可能是我们的教育体系构建和实践的产物。灌输式教育的许多教学方法人为分离了学习和使用之间的联系，认为知识系统是自给自足的整体，理论上独立于它所学习和使用的情境。学校主要关注的往往似乎是这种内容的转移，包括抽象的、脱离语境的形式上的概念。认知发生的活动和环境因此被视为仅仅是辅助学习，当然对教学也是有益的，但与要学的东西是根本不同的。然而，最近的对于学习的研究，挑战了这种将所学与学习和使用的环境分离的情况。现在被热议的是知识发展和展开的活动是不能与辅助的学习与认知活动分离。它不是中立的，相反的，它是一个不可分割的一部分。情境可能被认为是通过活动产生的。学习和认知现在被认为可能是基于情境的。在本文中，我们试图用一个刻意投机的方式解释，为什么活动和情境对认知与学习来说是不可或缺的，和提出对适当的学习活动会产生截然不同的结果的不同想法。我们认为，忽视了情境化认知的本质，教育原有的提供有用的强大的知识的目标是不可实现的。相反，我们认为情境认知（由柯林斯，布朗，纽曼先后提出），在加强对所学内容的理解和认知方面加入活动和有意使用社会和实际环境是新兴的研究路线。

情境化的知识和学习

米勒和吉尔迪亚（1987）对词汇教学的研究表明，假定的知行分离可导致忽视情境认知结构的教学方法。他们的工作描述了在校内孩子是如何从字典的定义和一些典型的句子方面学习词汇的，并和孩子们平常在校外的具体情境中学习词汇的情况进行了比较。通常人们在日常交流中学习单词。这个过程是惊人的迅速和成功。米勒和吉尔迪亚注意到，通过听、说、读，年龄在17岁左右的人这16年来学过的词汇量在每年5000字左右（每天13个）。相比之下，从抽象的定义与以和正常使用的语境脱离的方式学习单词和句子，是缓慢的，而且一般不成功。每一年几乎没有足够的教学时间教超过100至200字。此外，大多数情况下原来教的在实践中几乎是无用的。他们给出下面的例子展示学生通过这种方式获得词汇：

“我和我的父母相互关联，因为没有他们，我就不会在这里了。”

“我曾小心翼翼地掉下悬崖。”

“莫罗夫人聚集汤。”

以这样的方式学习，这样的错误好像是不可避免的。词典教学假设定义和典型句子是自足的知识的碎片。但是，单词和句子不是岛屿，能够完全自给自足。语言的使用是一个不断涉及到歧义，多义词，细微的差别，隐喻，等等这些，话语的语境提供言语外的帮助没有被解决。

语言需要依靠外部帮助就是索引词的作用，词语像我，在这里，现在，未来，明天，后来等等这些。索引条款是那些“索引”或更通俗一点的情况，情境正在进行中的一部分。他们不仅仅是上下文对应的；他们是完全依赖于上下文。例如像我或是现在这样的词，只能在其使用的语境解读。令人惊讶的是，所有的词都被看作是至少是部分索引。有经验的读者理解单词所处的情境。因此他们在致力于解释一个词的时候会联系剩下的句子或上下文。他们去查找字典中使用的例子的情境。这种情境或是字典能支持他们的解释。但是，我们的学生的造句没有从一个日常的实际情境得到支持。在他们的任务中，字典的定义是自给自足的。语言外的结构、限制，最终让普通情境的解释被忽略。从词典中学习，和其他任何方法一样，试图将抽象概念独立于真实的情况，忽略了通过持续的理解方式和使用的情境的作用。这一发展，涉及到复杂的社会协商，不会轻易形成了一个范畴的界定。因为它依赖情境，需要探讨，原则上一个单词的意思不能单纯由一个定义得到，甚至有时候一个定义需要好多典型例句的支持。首先文化形成的可能看起来有一点像学习。但是事实上，在学习说、读、写的人会做的事情，或成为学校的孩子、办公室工作人员、研究人员等等。从很早的时候，在他们的生活中人们自觉或不自觉地会采用社会群体的信仰系统相适应的行为。如果有机会去观察原来文化，人们拿起相关术语，模仿行为，并逐渐开始行动的规范。这些做法往往是深奥的、极为复杂的。

我们相信所有的知识都像语言一样。其组成部分都指向这个世界，它和产生它的活动和情境是不可分割的。例如一个概念，将随着每一次新的使用 情境不同而持续变化，因为新情境、谈判和活动不可避免地将它重塑为一个新的、更密集的结构形式。因此一个概念，像一个单词的意思，总是要在情境中被解释。这也似乎是显然明确定义的，抽象的技术概念。即使这些都不是完全自定义，并违抗分类描述;其含义部分总是从使用的上下文推断出来。

学习与工具的关系

为了探索概念都是通过情境和活动中逐渐发展起来的想法，我们应该摒弃任何抽象的、独立的概念。相反，类似的一套工具在某些方面可能被考虑作为概念知识更有用。工具与知识有着几个显著的共同特征：它们只能通过使用才能被充分的理解，并使用它们需要改变用户的世界观和采用他们的文化信仰体系。第一，如果知识被认为是工具，我们可以从怀特海得（1929）基础的概念仅仅是得到和开发有用的知识的区别中得到启发。这样很可能获得工具，但无法使用它。同样，学生获取算法，程序和语境的定义是很常见的，但他们不能使用，因此知识只能在中间搁浅。不幸的是，这个问题并不明显。例如老式的小刀，有一个装置可以从马蹄中除去石头。有这个装置的人可能知道它的用途并能明智地谈论马、马蹄和石头。但他们可能永远不会泄露---甚至承认，他们不知道如何开始使用这个实用的装置。同样，学生往往可以操纵算法，程序，并且可以概括出自己已经学会了哪些具有明显的竞争力的知识，但他们没有他们的老师或自己透露，如果他们真的遇上解释过的危机，他们可能会手足无措。那些是从实际情境中使用的工具而不仅仅是知道它们的使用方法，相反，他们使用的工具日益丰富并心领神会。人们对工具和世界两者的理解，因为相互作用的结果而不断改变。学习和活动是有趣的独特的，学习是一个连续的，终身的过程行为，它随情境的实际情况改变。学习如何使用工具不仅仅是学习那些明确的规则。使用的场合和条件将直接影响每一个社区活动。社区及其观点，相当多的是工具本身，决定如何利用工具。因此，木匠和内阁制造商使用凿子一样。因为工具和使用它们的方法反映特定社区见解的积累。因此不了解工具的使用情境和使用文化背景是用不好工具的。

将学科、专业、甚至手动交易社区或文化放在一起讨论人们可能会觉得奇怪。然而，社区从业人员的联系远远超过他们表面上的任务。他们是受复杂的、社会建构的信念的驱动，这对了解他们所做的是必要的（格尔茨，1983）。很多社区的活动是深不可测的，除非将他们放在特定的文化情境中考虑。文化和工具共同确定从业者看世界的方式；和世界展示给他们的方式决定了他们对世界文化的理解。不幸的是，学生们经常被要求使用一个学科的工具，却没有深入了解它的文化。像从业者学习使用工具一样，一个学生，就像一个学徒，必须进入社区和文化。因此，我们坚信学习在很大程度上是一个文化适应的过程。

外文文献出处：

J·S·Brown A·Collins． Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning[J]. Educational Researcher．1989:32-42

原文如下：

Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning

by John Seely Brown, Allan Collins and Paul Duguid
Educational Researcher; v18 n1, pp. 32-42, Jan-Feb 1989.

Abstract: Many teaching practices implicitly assume that conceptual knowledge can be abstracted from the situations in which it is learned and used. This article argues that this assumption inevitably limits the effectiveness of such practices. Drawing on recent research into cognition as it is manifest in everyday activity, the authors argue that knowledge is situated, being in part a product of the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed and used. They discuss how this view of knowledge affects our understanding of learning, and they note that conventional schooling too often ignores the influence of school culture on what is learned in school. As an alternative to conventional practices, they propose cognitive apprenticeship (Collins, Brown, Newman, in press), which honors the situated nature of knowledge. They examine two examples of mathematics instruction that exhibit certain key features of this approach to teaching.

The breach between learning and use, which is captured by the folk categories 'know what' and 'know how,' may well be a product of the structure and practices of our education system. Many methods of didactic education assume a separation between knowing and doing, treating knowledge as an integral, self-sufficient substance, theoretically independent of the situations in which it is learned and used. The primary concern of schools often seems to be the transfer of this substance, which comprises abstract, decontextualized formal concepts. The activity and context in which learning takes place are thus regarded as merely ancillary to learning---pedagogically useful, of course, but fundamentally distinct and even neutral with respect to what is learned.

Recent investigations of learning, however, challenge this separating of what is learned from how it is learned and used.¹ The activity in which knowledge is developed and deployed, it is now argued, is not separable from or ancillary to learning and cognition. Nor is it neutral. Rather, it is an integral part of what is learned. Situations might be said to co-produce knowledge through activity. Learning and cognition, it is now possible to argue, are fundamentally situated.

In this paper, we try to explain in a deliberately speculative way, why activity and sit

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Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning

by John Seely Brown, Allan Collins and Paul Duguid
Educational Researcher; v18 n1, pp. 32-42, Jan-Feb 1989.

Abstract: Many teaching practices implicitly assume that conceptual knowledge can be abstracted from the situations in which it is learned and used. This article argues that this assumption inevitably limits the effectiveness of such practices. Drawing on recent research into cognition as it is manifest in everyday activity, the authors argue that knowledge is situated, being in part a product of the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed and used. They discuss how this view of knowledge affects our understanding of learning, and they note that conventional schooling too often ignores the influence of school culture on what is learned in school. As an alternative to conventional practices, they propose cognitive apprenticeship (Collins, Brown, Newman, in press), which honors the situated nature of knowledge. They examine two examples of mathematics instruction that exhibit certain key features of this approach to teaching.

The breach between learning and use, which is captured by the folk categories 'know what' and 'know how,' may well be a product of the structure and practices of our education system. Many methods of didactic education assume a separation between knowing and doing, treating knowledge as an integral, self-sufficient substance, theoretically independent of the situations in which it is learned and used. The primary concern of schools often seems to be the transfer of this substance, which comprises abstract, decontextualized formal concepts. The activity and context in which learning takes place are thus regarded as merely ancillary to learning---pedagogically useful, of course, but fundamentally distinct and even neutral with respect to what is learned.

Recent investigations of learning, however, challenge this separating of what is learned from how it is learned and used.¹ The activity in which knowledge is developed and deployed, it is now argued, is not separable from or ancillary to learning and cognition. Nor is it neutral. Rather, it is an integral part of what is learned. Situations might be said to co-produce knowledge through activity. Learning and cognition, it is now possible to argue, are fundamentally situated.

In this paper, we try to explain in a deliberately speculative way, why activity and situations are integral to cognition and learning, and how different ideas of what is appropriate learning activity produce very different results. We suggest that, by ignoring the situated nature of cognition, education defeats its own goal of providing useable, robust knowledge. And conversely, we argue that approaches such as cognitive apprenticeship (Collins, Brown, amp; Newman, in press) that embed learning in activity and make deliberate use of the social and physical context are more in line with the understanding of learning and cognition that is emerging from research.

Situated Knowledge and Learning

Miller and Gildeas (1987) work on vocabulary teaching has shown how the assumption that knowing and doing can be separated leads to a teaching method that ignores the way situations structure cognition. Their work has described how children are taught words from dictionary definitions and a few exemplary sentences, and they have compared this method with the way vocabulary is normally learned outside school.

People generally learn words in the context of ordinary communication. This process is startlingly fast and successful. Miller and Gildea note that by listening, talking, and reading, the average 17-year-old has learned vocabulary at a rate of 5,000 words per year (13 per day) for over 16 years. By contrast, learning words from abstract definitions and sentences taken out of the context of normal use, the way vocabulary has often been taught, is slow and generally unsuccessful. There is barely enough classroom time to teach more than 100 to 200 words per year. Moreover, much of what is taught turns out to be almost useless in practice. They give the following examples of students uses of vocabulary acquired this way:

'Me and my parents correlate, because without them I wouldnt be here.'

'I was meticulous about falling off the cliff.'

'Mrs. Morrow stimulated the soup.'²

Given the method, such mistakes seem unavoidable. Teaching from dictionaries assumes that definitions and exemplary sentences are self-contained 'pieces' of knowledge. But words and sentences are not islands, entire unto themselves. Language use would involve an unremitting confrontation with ambiguity, polysemy, nuance, metaphor, and so forth were these not resolved with the extralinguistic help that the context of an utterance provides (Nunberg, 1978).

Prominent among the intricacies of language that depend on extralinguistic help are indexical words --- words like I, here, now, next, tomorrow, afterwards, this. Indexical terms are those that 'index'or more plainly point to a part of the situation in which communication is being conducted.³ They are not merely context-sensitive; they are completely context-dependent. Words like I or now, for instance, can only be interpreted in the context of their use. Surprisingly, all words can be seen as at least partially indexical (Barwise amp; Perry, 1983).

Experienced readers implicitly understand that words are situated. They, therefore, ask for the rest of the sentence or the context before committing themselves to an interpretation of a word. And they go to dictionaries with situated examples of usage in mind. The situation as well as the dictionary supports the interpretation. But the students who produced the sentences listed had no support from a normal communica

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