关于商业银行加快杭州小微企业贷款业务发展的对策研究 ——以中国建设银行为例外文翻译资料

关于商业银行加快杭州小微企业贷款业务发展的对策研究

——以中国建设银行为例

原文作者 United States Government Accountability Office

摘要：GAO（美国政府问责局）对于小型企业贷款基金的业务制定的计划，通过评估小型企业以及其参与者的综合数据，GAO的第一份和第二份报告涉及该计划的实施和绩效报告，并提出了建议，关于管理监督，计划评估和绩效报告。第三份报告考察了合格的小企业贷款的增长及其变化的原因。SBLF银行的增长以及财政部已采取的评估行动参与者贷款模式。高分析了最新的可用绩效和财务信息SBLF参与者。

关键词：美国政府问责局； 小型企业贷款； 财政部；评估数据

一、GAO为什么要进行这项研究

2010年的《小企业就业法》旨在通过在财政部内建立SBLF（SMALL BUSINESS LENDING FUND，小型企业贷款基金）计划等措施来刺激就业增长。 SBLF被授权进行至多300亿美元的资本投资，以鼓励资产不足100亿美元的银行和社区发展贷款基金增加其小企业贷款。该法案通常将“小企业贷款”定义为最初不超过1000万美元的贷款。根据该法案，GAO是受权每年对SBLF进行一次审核。 GAO的第一份和第二份报告涉及该计划的实施和绩效报告，并提出了建议，关于管理监督，计划评估和绩效报告。第三份报告考察了合格的小企业贷款的增长及其变化的原因。SBLF银行的增长以及财政部已采取的评估行动参与者贷款模式。高分析了最新的可用绩效和财务信息SBLF参与者；已审查政府和私营部门调查在小企业信贷条件下；并采访了财政部官员和SBLF的代表参与者。

1. GAO的建议

财政部应继续进行影响评估，其中包括将小型企业贷款基金的影响与小企业贷款参与者的其他因素隔离的方法。在对本报告草案的书面评论中，财政部同意执行该建议。

1. GAO发现了什么

根据美国财政部（Treasury）的资料，截至2013年6月30日，小企业贷款基金（SBLF）参与者的合格小企业贷款比2010年的总基准365亿美元增加了104亿美元。但是，SBLF参与者增加小企业贷款的程度差异很大。GAO对截至2013年6月30日的季度的分析显示，排名靠前（第一个）的四分之一的SBLF银行中位数比基线提高了100％以上底部（第四）四分位数的SBLF银行中位数增长百分比。GAO分析的几个因素可以帮助解释这种差异。例如，位于最低四分位数的银行的中位数银行比位于最高四分位数的银行的不良贷款更多，这可能会影响银行的借贷能力。此外，处于最低贷款四分位数中的大多数银行都使用其SBLF资金中的大部分来偿还投资从美国财政部的资本购买计划中获得的收益，使他们的可用资本净增加额要小得多。GAO接受采访的几家银行表示，随着经济的改善，他们对信贷的需求也在增加。此外，公开报告的调查表明，信贷状况有所改善，但是一些小型企业仍面临着获取信贷的挑战。

财政部已采取措施评估SBLF参与者的借贷模式，包括进行同伴分析并通过对SBLF参与者的年度调查收集绩效数据。但是，这些步骤不足以隔离SBLF对参与者贷款的净影响。财政部官员说，他们正在探索评估方法，并与一家公司签有合同，以帮助确定可以使用的统计分析，但没有提供有关采用某种方法的评估计划的文档。GAO关于计划评估的指南建议，通常需要通过影响评估来评估计划的净影响，方法是将观察到的结果与没有计划时可能发生的情况进行比较，以评估计划的净影响。通过进行包括评估SBLF净影响的方法在内的评估，财政部可以更有效地向公众和国会通报与其他因素（例如经济状况）相比，SBLF如何影响参与者的贷款，并可以更好地帮助国会就支持类似的资本投资计划或支持小企业获得资本的替代计划做出未来决策。

2013年12月11日，国会委员会为了回应近年来对小型企业面临的挑战的担忧，国会颁布了2010年《小型企业就业法》。该法授权财政部高达300亿美元的可用资金。除此以外，该法律旨在通过建立小型企业贷款基金（SBLF）来鼓励就业，以鼓励资产少于100亿美元的金融机构增加对小型企业的贷款。年收入高达5000万美元。2011年，有935个金融机构向该计划申请了总金额为117亿美元的资金。到2011年9月，财政部已通过购买优先股或债务工具为332家机构批准了40亿美元的资金。在这40亿美元中，有39亿美元流向了281家银行，向51个社区发展贷款基金（CDLF）提供1.04亿加元。SBLF额外的资金将授予金融机构。2010年《小企业就业法》授权我们每年进行一次SBLF计划的审核。在我们的第一份和第二份报告中，我们回顾了SBLF的实施情况，并提出了建议，以改善该计划的管理监督，计划评估和绩效报告。该第三份报告探讨了（1）SBLF的状态；（2）确定SBLF银行合格小企业贷款增长变化的原因；（3）财政部已采取措施评估SBLF参与者的贷款模式。

为了检查计划状态，包括参与者的贷款，股息和利息支付，我们审查了截至2013年6月30日的美国财政部数据以及美国财政部2013年7月和2013年10月的贷款增长报告。5我们还采访了美国财政部官员。为了检查退出计划的过程以及参与者退出的原因，我们收集了文件并采访了财政部和三个银行监管机构的官员：货币主计长办公室（OCC），联邦储备系统理事会（联邦储备）和联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）。我们与这些银行监管机构进行了交谈，以获取有关其在批准SBLF赎回中的作用的信息。截至2013年7月1日，已有16位参与者退出了该计划。其中有6位参与者告诉美国财政部他们离开的原因。我们联系了其他10位离开的参与者，并且没有跟财政部共享退出的原因，并获得了9位的回复。为了确定SBLF银行小企业贷款增长变化的原因的已知原因，我们根据美国财政部的《贷款增长报告》将265家银行分为根据截至2013年6月30日的合格小企业贷款水平划分出四个四分位数，并使用财务和监管数据（包括通话报告数据和CAMELS综合评级）将这四个四分位数进行了比较。我们访问了SBLF银行的通话报告数据使用SNL Financial（一家管理包含公开提交的监管和财务报告的财务数据库的公司）并分析了诸如资产规模，德克萨斯州比率和收到的SBLF净资本等数据，以及其他变量，以此来评估与不同因素相关的因素。我们还分析了FDIC的CAMELS综合评级，以确定SBLF库四分位数之间是否存在差异。此外，我们进行了回归分析，以同时控制SBLF银行的财务状况的多个方面，并试图说明州一级的经济状况。为了描述一些SBLF银行在增加对小企业贷款方面取得或多或少成功的原因，我们还选择并尝试联系基于地域分布和参与美国财政部资本购买计划（CPP）的12家银行的非概率判断性样本，我们从其中的10个中获得了回应。我们还采访了负责该计划的财政官员并联系了全国独立企业联合会的代表，因为它定期调查小型企业以及美国银行家协会和独立社区银行家协会，因为它们代表了社区银行的利益。我们还使用了许多其他调查指标，这些指标提供了有关小企业信贷市场状况的各种观点。我们评估了用于分析的数据的可靠性，例如，检查数据以发现缺失的观察值和异常值，并审查GAO先前的工作并酌情更新信息。我们确定，由美国财政部，FDIC和SNL Financial收集的数据以及我们所审查的调查指标足够可靠，目的是对程序状态和SBLF银行合格小企业贷款的变化变化提供高水平的概述。为了确定财政部为评估SBLF参与者贷款模式而采取的行动，我们回顾了美国财政部于2012年10月，2013年1月，4月，7月和2013年10月发布的贷款增长报告，以及其首个年度贷款调查工具和结果报告以及相关支持这些报告的文件。我们采访了美国财政部官员，了解该机构为评估计划绩效所做的努力。我们也回顾了我们关于SBLF的2011年和2012年报告，以记录美国财政部的过去评估SBLF绩效的努力。我们回顾了GAO计划评估指南以及GAO过去关于联邦的工作政府绩效管理，并将其与库务行动。此外，我们还审查了影响评估由GAO和其他联邦机构进行，以增强我们的理解并提供影响评估和统计的示例技术。

外文文献出处：U.S. Government Accountability Office.SMALL BUSINESS LENDING FUND Treasury Should Ensure Evaluation Includes Methods to Isolate Program Impact[J].Economics,2013,12:5-47.

附外文文献原文

Why GAO Did This Study

The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 aimed to stimulate job growth by, among other things, establishing the SBLF program within Treasury. SBLF was authorized to make up to $30 billion in capital investments to encourage banks and community development loan funds with assets of less than $10 billion to increase their small business lending. The act generally defined “small business lending” as loans not more than $10 million originally. Under the act, GAO is mandated to conduct an audit of SBLF annually. GAOrsquo;s first and second reports were on the programrsquo;s implementation and performance reporting and made recommendations on management oversight, program evaluation, and performance reporting. This third report examines (1) the growth in qualified small business lending and reasons for variations in the growth at SBLF banks and (2) actions Treasury has taken to evaluate participant lending patterns. GAO analyzed the most recent available performance and financial information on SBLF participants; reviewed government and private sector surveys on small business credit conditions; and interviewed officials from Treasury and representatives from SBLF participants.

What GAO Recommends

Treasury should follow through in conducting an impact evaluation that includes methods to isolate the effect of SBLF from other factors on participantsrsquo; small business lending. In written comments on a draft of this report, Treasury agreed to implement the recommendation.

What GAO Found

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), as of June 30, 2013, Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) participants had increased their qualified small business lending by $10.4 billion over their aggregate 2010 baseline of $36.5 billion. However, SBLF participants varied greatly in the extent to which they had increased small business lending. GAO analysis for the quarter ending June 30, 2013, showed that the median SBLF bank in the top (fir

剩余内容已隐藏，支付完成后下载完整资料

Why GAO Did This Study

The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 aimed to stimulate job growth by, among other things, establishing the SBLF program within Treasury. SBLF was authorized to make up to $30 billion in capital investments to encourage banks and community development loan funds with assets of less than $10 billion to increase their small business lending. The act generally defined “small business lending” as loans not more than $10 million originally. Under the act, GAO is mandated to conduct an audit of SBLF annually. GAOrsquo;s first and second reports were on the programrsquo;s implementation and performance reporting and made recommendations on management oversight, program evaluation, and performance reporting. This third report examines (1) the growth in qualified small business lending and reasons for variations in the growth at SBLF banks and (2) actions Treasury has taken to evaluate participant lending patterns. GAO analyzed the most recent available performance and financial information on SBLF participants; reviewed government and private sector surveys on small business credit conditions; and interviewed officials from Treasury and representatives from SBLF participants.

What GAO Recommends

Treasury should follow through in conducting an impact evaluation that includes methods to isolate the effect of SBLF from other factors on participantsrsquo; small business lending. In written comments on a draft of this report, Treasury agreed to implement the recommendation.

What GAO Found

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), as of June 30, 2013, Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) participants had increased their qualified small business lending by $10.4 billion over their aggregate 2010 baseline of $36.5 billion. However, SBLF participants varied greatly in the extent to which they had increased small business lending. GAO analysis for the quarter ending June 30, 2013, showed that the median SBLF bank in the top (first) quartile had over a 100 percent increase over the baseline, compared to a 9.1 percent increase for the median SBLF bank in the bottom (fourth) quartile. Several factors GAO analyzed could help explain this variation. For example, the median bank in the bottom quartile had more troubled loans than banks in the top quartile, which could affect a bankrsquo;s lending capacity. Also, a majority of banks in the bottom lending quartile used much of their SBLF funds to repay investments received from Treasuryrsquo;s Capital Purchase Program, leaving them with a much smaller net increase in available capital. Several banks GAO interviewed said that they have seen increased demand for credit as the economy improved. In addition, publicly reported surveys indicate that credit conditions have improved, but some small businesses continue to face challenges securing credit.

Treasury has taken steps to assess SBLF participantsrsquo; lending patterns, including conducting a peer-group analysis and collecting performance data through an annual survey of SBLF participants. However, these steps are not sufficient to isolate the net impact of SBLF on participantsrsquo; lending. Treasury officials said that they are exploring evaluation approaches and have a firm under contract to help identify statistical analyses that could be used, but have not provided documentation of its evaluation plan committing to an approach. GAO guidance on program evaluation suggests that impact evaluations are usually required to assess the net impact of a program by comparing the observed outcomes to an estimate of what would have happened in the programrsquo;s absence. By conducting an evaluation that includes methods to assess the net impact of SBLF, Treasury could more effectively inform the public and Congress on how SBLF has affected the participantsrsquo; lending compared to other factors, such as economic conditions, and could better assist Congress in making future decisions about similar capital investment programs or alternative programs that support small business access to capital.

December 11, 2013 Congressional Committees In response to concerns about challenges faced by small businesses in recent years, Congress enacted the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to make up to $30 billion of capital available and offered incentives to financial institutions to increase small business lending.1 Among other things, the law aimed to stimulate job growth by establishing the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) to encourage financial institutions with assets of less than $10 billion to increase their lending to small businesses with up to $50 million in annual revenues. In 2011, 935 financial institutions applied to the program for a combined funding request of $11.7 billion. By September 2011, Treasury had approved $4 billion for 332 institutions through Treasury purchases of preferred stock or debt instruments. Of this $4 billion, $3.9 billion went to 281 banks and $104 million to 51 community development loan funds (CDLF).2 No additional SBLF funds will be awarded to financial institutions. The 2010 Small Business Jobs Act mandates us to conduct an annual audit of the SBLF program.3 In our first and second reports, we reviewed the implementation of SBLF and made recommendations to improve the programrsquo;s management oversight, program evaluation, and performance reporting.4 This third report examines (1) the status of SBLF; (2) identified reasons for variation in growth of qualified small business lending at SBLF banks; and (3) actions.

To examine program status, including participantsrsquo; lending, and dividend and interest payments, we reviewed Treasury data as of June 30, 2013, and Treasuryrsquo;s July and October 2013 Lending Growth Reports.5 We also interviewed Treasury officials. To examine the process for exiting the program and participantsrsquo; reasons for exiting, we collected documents and interviewe

剩余内容已隐藏，支付完成后下载完整资料

资料编号：[275653]，资料为PDF文档或Word文档，PDF文档可免费转换为Word