Information disclosure in credit markets when banksrsquo; costs are endogenous
Abstract
In this paper we develop a model of information disclosure among banks based on an endogenous interest rate for externally placed debt. Banks with private credit information are given an opportunity to disclose information prior to competing for borrowers. While disclosure eliminates a bankrsquo;s information advantage over its competitors, disclosing information creates a new advantage for the bank in terms of a lower cost of external funds. We find that the incentive for a bank to disclose information is inversely related to the bankrsquo;s capital ratio and positively related to the number of other banks that disclose information.
Keywords
Information disclosure;
Bank competition;
External debt
1. Introduction
One of the more important roles of banks is the initiation and management of lending relationships with borrowers. The resources that banks devote to these relationships generate valuable information about the creditworthiness of borrowers. This credit information is private information, which is one of the main reasons why banking is described as an opaque business.1 The opaqueness however, is mitigated to some extent, as banks sometimes elect to disclose private credit information about their borrowers. In certain countries, such as the United States and Japan, there is a large amount of information disclosure by banks; yet in other parts of the world such as Latin America and Asia, disclosure is less common.2 The importance of information disclosure is supported by a growing empirical literature, which finds that disclosure tends to improve credit market performance. The results of studies by Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Love and Mylenko, 2003; Djankovensp;et al., 2007 ; Brownensp;et al., 2009 make a convincing argument that information sharing is associated with a reduction in financing constraints and deeper credit markets.
While disclosure of information may be associated with better functioning credit markets, it is certainly not obvious that individual banks will want to disclose their information. In a survey of the relationship lending literature, Boot (2000) observes that these lending relationships are defined by proprietary information, and it is the corresponding advantage that explains an incumbent bankrsquo;s ability to profit relative to de novo lenders. In order to understand why a bank would elect to give up such information, the theoretical literature has put forward several ideas.3 For the most part, this research focuses on the different ways that information sharing can impact the repayment revenue a bank receives from its loans. For example, a bank may disclose credit information if it generates benefits in the form of reciprocated information disclosure, or improved repayment incentives on the part of borrowers.
The contribution of our paper is to link the bankrsquo;s incentive to disclose information to the bankrsquo;s cost of funds. The insight is that a bank may choose to disclose positive information to the market in order to lower the cost of externally raised debt. The tradeoff is that in order to convince external investors about the quality of its loan portfolio, the bank must reveal information that can be utilized by competing banks. Faced with this tradeoff, we identify the conditions under which a bank can profit from disclosing all of its propriety information to the market.
The model that we develop rests on the notion that external investors charge banks different rates according to the perceived risk of their loan portfolios. The relevance of this type of funding in banking is well documented by the empirical literature on market discipline. For example, papers such as Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; 银行成本内在化时信贷市场的信息披露
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