财务报告准则变动对财务会计方法选择的影响 假设理论与发展外文翻译资料

The impact of changes in financial reporting regulation on financial accounting method choice

财务报告准则变动对财务会计方法选择的影响

Gerard Mertens

Maastricht University, The Netherlands

This dissertation examines the effects of financial accounting regulation on financial reporting practices in the Netherlands. Because of the comparatively late introduction of accounting regulation in the Netherlands, the Dutchcontext offers an excellent opportunity for empirical accounting research into regulatory effects. The institutional setting described in the first part and empirically tested in the second part is one of increased financial accounting regulation, in which firms reactions with respect to accounting policy choice can be examined. The results provided suggest that as a result of the implementation of accounting regulation there are economic consequences which go beyond the scope of the regulation that is implemented.

本文研究了荷兰财务会计制度对财务报告实务的影响。荷兰引入会计监管相对较晚，为规范效应的实证会计研究提供了极好的机会。第一部分描述的制度设置和第二部分经验性检验的制度设置是增加的财务会计法规之一，这可以检测企业对会计政策选择的反应。所提供的结果表明，由于实施会计法规，存在超出所实施法规范围的经济后果。

THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

The study introduces economic theory explaining accounting method choice based on the recognition of contracting costs. This theory explains the rationale for firms to supply financial accounting information, the factors that determine firms choices of financial accounting methods, and it discusses the effect of government financial reporting regulation on firms accounting method choices. Assuming that the set of available accounting policies (the accepted set) has been limited through the introduction of additional financial reporting regulations, two competing theoretical perspectives can be distinguished regarding the effects of government financial reporting intervention.

The first perspective, opportunistic behaviour, is based on the assumption that managers increase their welfare at the expense of other stakeholders in the firm, such as the shareholders, bondholders, and employees. A restriction of the accepted set through financial reporting regulation will then prevent managers from acting opportunistically, assuming that this regulation will be effective. The second perspective, efficient contracting, asserts that firms will choose the optimal mix of accounting methods from a set of accounting methods voluntarily determined by the firm and its stakeholders. In this case, a restriction of the accepted set through government intervention would therefore lead to suboptimal and thus more costly (contracting) solutions. Based on a historical analysis of the political debates, articles and government reports, it is then pointed out that Dutch policy-makers assumed that firms management acted opportunistically. They expected that regulatory intervention would limit firms opportunistic actions.

The empirical part of the dissertation has focused on testing the effects of the implementation of the Act on Annual Financial Statements (WJO) in 1971 and the European Economic Community (EEC) Fourth Directive (Title 8)' in 1984. The first part of the dissertation portrays the history of financial reporting regulation in the Netherlands and analyses the contents of the two financial reporting Acts. The first major accounting regulation in the Netherlands, the WJO, was finally implemented in 1971. Its main purpose was to increase firms disclosure of financial accounting information. The second major shift in accounting regulation, the implementation of the Fourth Directive in 1984 into Dutch legislation, was motivated by the desire of the European Community members to harmonize financial reporting within the Member States. The analysis of the content of the sections relating to disclosure policy and accounting methods shows that the regulations in the two Acts stipulate many disclosure rules (form and detail) and only a limited number of valuation principles.

Based on the analyses of both Acts, two sets of hypotheses are developed. The first set specifically relate to expectations regarding changes in the frequency and magnitude of accounting method changes (method I) before and after the implementation of both Acts. The second set of hypotheses refer to expectations regarding changes in the level and variability of accounting accruals and earnings (method II) before and after the implementation of both regulations. Finally, hypotheses for both sets, accounting method changes and accruals/earnings, are introduced to test for the impact of three firm characteristics: size, leverage and industry.

RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL TESTS

The analysis of the number, nature, and magnitude of accounting method changes (method I) made by firms in the periods before and after the introduction of the WJO and Title 8. The results show that in the years the Acts were introduced, 1971 and 1984, the number of accounting changes increased significantly. The levels afterwards were not significantly higher compared to those before. The evidence therefore suggests that firms managements used accounting changes more intensively only during the implementation of both Acts. In the case of the WJO, the number and magnitude of accounting changes with an effect on earnings and equity increased after its implementation, and there were more positive than negative earnings changes. The evidence regarding the effects of Title 8 in this respect is less strong. Both frequency and magnitude, including the sign of the changes, did not change. More significant findings are reported on the firm characteristics size, leverage, and industry. They indicate that: (1) larger firms made more measurement changes, but the increase in total accounting changes was the highest for small firms suggesting that small and medium sized firms were more affected by both regulations (while large firms anticipat

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财务报告准则变动对财务会计方法选择的影响

假设理论与发展

本研究引入经济理论解释了基于合同成本确认的会计方法选择。该理论解释了企业提供财务会计信息的基本原理、决定企业选择财务会计方法的因素，并讨论了政府财务报告制度对企业选择会计方法的影响。假设通过引入额外的财务报告条例，现有会计政策集（“公认集”）受到限制，就政府财务报告干预的影响，可以区分两个相互竞争的理论观点。

第一种观点，即机会主义行为，是基于管理者以牺牲公司其他利益相关者（如股东、债券持有人和员工）为代价来增加福利这样一种假设。通过财务报告监管对公认的一套规则加以限制，将防止经理们投机，假设这一监管将有效。第二种观点，即有效承包，这种观点认为企业将从企业及其利益相关者自愿确定的一套会计方法中选择最佳的会计方法组合。在这种情况下，通过政府干预对可接受的方案集的限制将导致次优方案，从而导致成本更高（承包）的解决方案。在对政治辩论、文章和政府报告进行历史分析的基础上，指出荷兰的决策者认为企业的管理是机会主义的。他们预计监管干预将限制公司的机会主义行为。

本文的实证部分重点研究了1971年《年度财务报表法》（WJO）和1984年《欧洲经济共同体第四项指令》（第8篇）的实施效果。论文的第一部分阐述了荷兰财务报告监管的历史，分析了两项财务报告法的内容。荷兰第一个主要的会计法规WJO最终于1971年实施，其主要目的是增加企业对财务会计信息的披露。第二个主要的会计法规转变，即1984年第四项指令在荷兰立法中的实施，是受欧洲共同体成员国协调成员国内部财务报告的愿望推动的。对披露政策和会计方法部分内容的分析表明，两项法案的规定规定了许多披露规则(形式和细节)，仅规定了有限数量的估值原则。

在分析这两种行为的基础上，提出了两套假设。第一组具体涉及两项法案实施前后会计方法变更（方法一）的频率和幅度变化的预期。第二组假设是指关于会计应计项目和收益水平变化和可变性的预期（方法二），在两项法规实施前后。最后，引入两套假设、会计方法变更和应计/收益，以检验三个公司特征（规模、杠杆和行业）的影响。

检验结果

公司在引入WJO和第8篇之前和之后的会计方法变更（方法一）的数量、性质和数量的分析。结果表明，1971年和1984年《公司法》实施后，会计变更数量显著增加。之后的水平没有明显高于之前的水平。因此，有证据表明，只有在这两项法案的实施过程中，企业管理层才会更加集中地使用会计变更。就WJO而言，实施后会计变更对盈利和权益产生影响的数量和数量有所增加，且盈利变动的正面多于负面。关于第8篇在这方面的影响的证据不那么有力。频率和幅度，包括变化的符号，都没有变化。更重要的调查结果报告了公司的特征、规模、杠杆率和行业。他们指出：（1）较大的公司进行了更多的计量变更，但总的会计变更的增加对小公司来说是最高的，这表明中小型公司受这两项法规的影响更大（而大公司对法规的预期更大）；（2）杠杆率较高的公司似乎受到了更多的影响。Y法规，因为它们显示了会计变更的最大增加，对收益和/或权益产生影响，以及（3）法规的影响在不同行业中有所不同。这些结果提供了支持有效收缩假设的证据。

随后，对强制性财务报告监管影响的实证分析从会计方法变更的角度转向应计项目和收益模式（方法二）。结果表明，由于监管，（1）收入可变性增加，（2）总应计项目水平增加（尤其是在实施年份），（3）总应计项目的可变性仅在WJO情况下下降。基于回归模型的非歧视性和任意性应计项目的后续分析提供了额外证据，证明报告的非歧视性应计项目的增加是由于财务会计法规的增加。根据该模型，任意应计项目的可变性有所增加。这可以解释为，管理层转换会计方法的机会有限，这也提供了理由，认为管理层正在使用更微妙的技术在收益管理上花费更多（昂贵）的资源，但没有完全成功地消除这些行为的影响，最后，测试公司是否具有行为特征。厄立特里斯理论可能会影响监管的影响，企业的反应表明，不同行业的收益和应计利润的变化也不同。所提供的证据也支持规模和债务/股权假设。

今天的许多法定报告技术最初是在自愿承包环境中发展起来的。有人认为，WJO只是荷兰现有财务报告惯例的编纂。此外，对其内容的分析表明，这两项规定的重点主要是披露规则和格式，而不是对计量或估价规则的限制。但是，本文提供的证据表明，企业确实受到了WJO和第8篇的新监管制度的影响。本文还提供了证据，证明这两项法规对企业财务报告的影响都超出了新法规对企业财务报告细节和格式的要求。除了大量的披露调整，特别是在引入WJO和第8条的那些年里，实证分析表明，计量变化的数量及其对收益和/或权益的影响不仅在引入年里有所增加，而且在之后的几年里也有所增加(尽管不显著)。此外，有证据表明，在财务报告监管增加后，收入的可变性增加了两倍。

注释

1、日期为1997年5月6日，导师为Willem F，J.Buijink教授。通讯地址：里杰克斯大学林堡经济学院。616，62000马里兰州马斯特里赫特，荷兰。

2、第8篇是荷兰实施的荷兰官方法律，该法律将第4条欧洲经济共同体指令的规定纳入荷兰立法（荷兰民法典第2册第8篇）。

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