品牌人格化对消费的影响

——以江小白为例

摘要： 定位品牌，拓展品牌，当市场不再青睐产品的时候该怎么样经营自己品牌使得自己的品牌不至于消亡，人格化是挽救品牌的一个重要举措，但是人格化要借助的四个因素，品牌认同、感知质量、他人感知、转换行为都不是一朝一夕能够办到的事情，要经历巨大的考验和亏损，才能使得原有的不善的品牌保存下来。

关键词：品牌人格化、品牌定位、品牌细分、品牌认同、感知质量、他人感知、转换行为

引用文献：

外文文献题目（中文翻译）：您应该把品牌带到哪里去吗？

原文作者 Aaker D A 单位：University of California, Berkeleys Haas School of Business

当市场变得充满敌意时，经理们会垂直扩展其品牌，也就是将品牌带入高于或低于当前职位的看似有吸引力的市场，这不足为奇。对于追求增长的公司而言，进入蓬勃发展的高端或价值细分市场的冲动也可能难以抗拒。抽签确实很强大；在某些情况下，垂直移动不仅是合理的，而且实际上对于生存也是必不可少的，即使对于具有规模经济，品牌资产和零售影响力的顶级品牌而言也是如此。但是，利用品牌进入高端或低端市场比最初看起来更危险。实际上，战场上到处都是死伤的品牌，应该向正在考虑扩展的管理人员发出警告。

然后，在采取行动之前，管理人员应确定奖励是否值得承担这些风险。机会有多大？品牌应该在新市场中保持目前的地位，还是完全重新定位品牌会更好？这种行动可能产生什么影响？垂直延伸是唯一的选择吗？推出新品牌会更好吗？游戏中过去的赢家和输家的经验可以帮助经理回答这些问题。

纵向扩展的挑战是在利用新机遇的同时，利用和保护原始品牌。

通常，我建议管理人员尽可能避免垂直扩展。这个概念存在一个固有的矛盾，因为品牌资产很大程度上建立在形象和感知价值上，而垂直移动很容易扭曲这些品质。但是，从来没有一个好词。管理者可能会发现自己面临着既出现机遇又面临战略威胁的局面，垂直扩展的替代方案可能会带来更高的风险和成本。此外，许多品牌在垂直方向上取得了成功。如果在评估了风险和回报后得出结论，即将进行纵向扩展，请谨慎行事。并记住，您的挑战将是在利用新机遇的同时，利用和保护原始品牌的价值。

进入细分市场

进入高端市场

将品牌从主流市场转移到高端市场的动机很明显：高端市场的利润率比中间市场高得多。更重要的是，新兴的高端细分市场似乎通常可以使整组疲倦的产品重新焕发活力。考虑一下微型酿酒厂，名牌咖啡，豪华车甚至高档水在各自类别中的表现。新近流行，激动人心的市场及其利润吸引了众多目光，但是在主流市场中牢固树立的品牌能否改变其形象，以至于可以竞争呢？

这个问题是信誉之一。大多数消费者会质疑一个以前廉价的品牌是否会拥有知识，能力以及是否会经营一个高档品牌并提供预期的功能和情感收益。甚至享有良好声誉的品牌也值得怀疑。例如，假日酒店（Holiday Inn）这个品牌代表舒适，朴实的家庭旅馆，在假日酒店（Holiday Inn）的皇冠假日酒店（Crowne Plaza）定位高端市场时，确实是一个障碍。最终，毫不奇怪，母公司放弃了与Holiday Inn的联系，让Crowne Plaza自行竞争。图像质量较低的低档品牌演变成高质量，更多高档品牌的情况很少。丰田公司就是这样一个例子，但是改变其形象花了十多年的时间，涉及到令人印象深刻的产品改进，并且花费了数十亿美元的广告费用。

与低档生产一样，进入高端市场的一种方法是推出或收购新品牌。例如，由于本田公司的经理们相信，本田公司的名称将成为该公司在以宝马和奔驰为主的高档市场上取得成功的能力的致命障碍，因此他们开发了Ac歌品牌。丰田和日产紧随雷克萨斯和英菲尼迪品牌。同样，Black＆Decker在1992年为建筑专业人士创建了一系列工具时，也使用了一个新品牌DeWalt。该公司的研究表明，建筑专业人士将Black＆Decker与自己动手的市场领域，尘土飞扬的人，甚至是爆米花该公司意识到，这类协会对于高级工具线并不是一个好兆头。

丰田拥有雷克萨斯（Lexus）或Black＆Decker拥有DeWalt的事实不一定是秘密。实际上，拥有“影子”代言可以帮助减少消费者对新品牌将没有持久力的怀疑。雷克萨斯没有公开地将其名称与丰田联系起来，对消费者说，它具有个人身份，这一说法比消费者是否了解这种联系更为重要。

但是，再次创建新品牌可能会非常昂贵-尤其是如果竞争对手包括知名品牌。例如，丰田汽车在雷克萨斯（Lexus）上进行了巨额投资，以帮助其成为一名参与者。有时可以通过许可其他产品类别中的高档品牌名称来降低成本，例如使用Tiffany名称的服装系列或使用Mercedes的家具系列，但是这种方法放弃了拥有高档品牌的战略力量。

重新定位整个品牌

这里的故事很简短。从主流或价值市场直接定位到高端市场几乎是不可能的。主流品牌只是缺乏高档的联想，例如用户形象，品牌个性和感知质量，这些不足以说服客户说产品或服务应具有较高的价格。而且，即使成功，大规模的举动也有可能会牺牲其母品牌的现有客户群-它的主要资产。随着品牌的变化以吸引新的市场，当前的顾客可能会对品牌不满意。西尔斯·罗巴克公司（Sears Roebuck＆Company）是在这一领域取得成功的少数公司之一。凭借出色的广告宣传和改变商店环境的巨额投资，西尔斯（Sears）取得了一些突破，尤其是在女装方面。但是，这样做的话，公司走了一条很好的路线：忠实的，注重价值的客户对他们所赚的钱有特别的期望，他们可能想知道新的品牌形象是否会改变这种状况。

使用子品牌

子品牌在高档运动中的作用与在小型企业中的作用相同：它们帮助经理人将其新的优质产品与原始品牌区分开来，同时利用这些母品牌的权益来影响消费者的购买决策。

高端运动中使用的子品牌在新进入品牌与母品牌之间的距离方面也有所不同。如果父母是本人的代言人（例如本叔叔的Country Inn大米），则品牌是相对独立的-子品牌建立自己的身份并影响消费者的购买决定。如果母品牌和子品牌是共同推动者，例如MJB EuroRoast咖啡或Black＆Decker Quantum工具，则每个品牌对购买决策的影响大致相等。当母品牌是带有子品牌描述词的驱动者时，例如Trefethen Library Reserve葡萄酒或GE Profile电器，子品牌根本不会形成唯一的身份；而是表示母品牌的高档变体。

在考虑高档子品牌时，考虑新产品的潜在客户至关重要。品牌真的会吸引惯于购买高端商品的人们吗？还是子品牌的最大潜力实际上在最高报价与母品牌地位之间？有时，最好将子品牌定位在高端市场的低端。对于那些认为自己是独立思想家而无需购买形象以打动人们的消费者而言，“超值”优质产品可能会吸引他们。低端高端品牌也吸引了那些想要成为高端利基市场但又买不起高端产品的人们。当一个主要咖啡品牌的经理决定以子品牌进入设计师咖啡市场时，他们对他们认为的目标市场（雅皮士消费者）进行了广泛的研究，并据此对子品牌进行了定位。该产品很成功，但是随后的研究表明，雅皮市场在该子品牌的客户中没有很好的代表；相反，市场变成了正在交易的主流消费者。

子品牌策略：降低风险

当市场下跌时hellip;尝试针对不同的细分市场创建质量上不同的产品。将条目定位为独特的新产品或服务产品的最佳选择。

一个品牌能处理多少？

在极少数情况下，单个品牌可以成功地从价值延伸到主流市场再到高端市场。索尼就是这样一个品牌。多年来，索尼品牌已在多个产品类别中自由地扩展了质量水平。例如，索尼随身听的价格范围从25美元到500美元以上，而不会混淆客户或损害品牌。不过，索尼战略的智慧值得商de。可以肯定地说，索尼在品牌知名度和影响力方面所取得的成就弥补了其低档产品带来的任何负面影响。但是我们永远无法知道，如果索尼保护自己的品牌名称并为低端市场创造一个独立的价值品牌，它会比现在更好。还值得一提的是，即使是索尼，也没有在所有品牌中全都使用它的名字。索尼购买了洛斯（Loews）电影院连锁店时，最初是在剧院上映。该公司意识到大部分Loews剧院都是古老的，并且没有提供与Sony名称兼容的电影体验，因此该公司很快退出了该协会，并将Loews的名称重新用于大多数剧院，除了一些较新的剧院具有IMAX声音并增强了索尼品牌代表的大部分功能。

索尼的经历确实很少见。如果两个市场在沟通和分配方面非常独立，则可能有两个不同的头寸（主流市场的头寸头寸和价值市场的头寸头寸）。但是，市场很少有如此明显的区别。

考虑一下列维·斯特劳斯和花旗银行。两者都是远东和欧洲的高端知名品牌，但在美国却是主流的功能品牌。品牌之间相似的图像冲突问题在一定程度上已通过其市场之间的地理距离得以缓解。但是即使有了这样的缓冲，这些公司仍然面临困难。花旗银行向与该公司在几个国家有业务往来的全球客户发送不同的信息，这是一个日益增长的细分市场，正变得越来越重要。而且，由于在美国销售的产品的零售价格通常远低于欧洲的批发价格，因此李维·斯特劳斯（Levi Strauss）受到所谓的灰色销售（即通过未经授权但合法的渠道出售商品）的困扰。例如，英国领先的零售连锁店乐购（Tesco）最近在灰色市场上购买了45,000件男士501牛仔裤，其售价远低于Levi Strauss直接提供的商店所收取的价格。结果？授权零售商失去了推荐或购买该产品线的动力，客户失去了以原价购买正品Levis所带来的情感收益。

在考虑垂直扩展时，请记住这些情况。评估并重新评估机会和风险。研究您的品牌地位，优势，劣势和信息。如果您打算进行高端或低端升级，请强烈考虑发布新品牌。如果您可以控制品牌组合，可以考虑使用RCA作为价格品牌，将Hotpoint作为价值品牌，并保留GE，GE Profile和GE，从而像通用电气一样合理化产品线。会标的高档产品。如果可以购买新品牌，请购买。重新定位的风险由您自己承担，并且仅在子品牌的发布与核心品牌一样受到照料的情况下才使用子品牌。

附外文文献原文：

When markets turn hostile, itrsquo;s no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically—that is, to take brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but is actually essential to survival—even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. In fact, the battlefield is littered with dead and wounded brands that should serve as a warning to managers who are thinking about such extensions.

Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. How great is the opportunity? Should the brand retain its current position in a new market, or would it be better to reposition the brand entirely? What are the possible repercussions of such actions? Is a vertical extension the only choice? Would launching a new brand be a better alternative? The experiences of past winners and losers in the game can help managers answer those questions.

The challenge of vertical extensions is to leverage and protect the original brand while taking advantage of the

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When markets turn hostile, itrsquo;s no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically—that is, to take brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but is actually essential to survival—even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. In fact, the battlefield is littered with dead and wounded brands that should serve as a warning to managers who are thinking about such extensions.

Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. How great is the opportunity? Should the brand retain its current position in a new market, or would it be better to reposition the brand entirely? What are the possible repercussions of such actions? Is a vertical extension the only choice? Would launching a new brand be a better alternative? The experiences of past winners and losers in the game can help managers answer those questions.

The challenge of vertical extensions is to leverage and protect the original brand while taking advantage of the new opportunity.

In general, I would recommend that managers avoid vertical extensions whenever possible. There is an inherent contradiction in the very concept because brand equity is built in large part on image and perceived worth, and a vertical move can easily distort those qualities. But never is a strong word. Managers may find themselves facing a situation that presents both an emerging opportunity and a strategic threat, and alternatives to vertical extensions may have even higher risks and costs. Furthermore, a number of brands have extended vertically with complete success. If after assessing the risks and rewards you conclude that a vertical extension is on the horizon, proceed with caution. And keep in mind that your challenge will be to leverage and protect the value of the original brand while taking advantage of the new opportunity.

Accessing Downscale Markets

Letrsquo;s first consider taking a brand into value territory. Sometimes an opportunity emerges within a brandrsquo;s current distribution channel—a boom in the value segment of any given product category sold through a supermarket, for example. More often, the opportunity is created or accompanied by its own low-cost distribution channel, and companies must prepare to sell their products through that channel. Specialty superstores such as Home Depot and Circuit City, for example, have created category-dominant outlets with price-sensitive customers and significant economies of scale. Warehouse clubs such as Price Club and discount stores such as Wal-Mart also are prime examples. And direct marketing, which has changed the cost structure in the computer industry and elsewhere, provides access to a value-oriented segment as well.

Who wouldnrsquo;t be tempted to shift or at least to branch into a sizable and growing value market? This type of vertical extension promises increased volume and economies of scale. In addition, it promises protection from private-label and price-brand competitors, and from lower-quality, offshore entries. Whatrsquo;s more, brands shift downward easily—sometimes inadvertently. The danger in a move down market is that once a brand has associated its name with a downscale offering—even if the move represents only a slight change in price or performance—it runs the risk of losing its stature as a higher-priced (and by inference, higher-quality) brand.

Consider the results of a research study conducted by Carol Motley, a professor at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, and Srinivas Reddy, a professor at the University of Georgia. When Motley and Reddy presented consumers with repositioning statements for Kmart, a discount department store, and for Saks Fifth Avenue, a high-end department store, they found that peoplersquo;s attitudes toward Kmart did not change even when the store was described as being upscale. In contrast, people reported that they thought less of Saks when the store was described as being downscale or even mainstream. Indeed, the damage that the Cadillac Cimarron, the Cadillac version of a Chevrolet compact car, caused the Cadillac brand in the 1980s attests to the potential dangers of a downscale move.

One way to avoid any negative repercussions of accessing a downscale market is to launch a new brand. In 1993, the clothing retailer Gap found that competitors were targeting its value-conscious customers by offering Gap-like fashions for 20% to 30% below the companyrsquo;s prices. So managers decided to test Gap Warehouse, a store with merchandise offering the Gap flair but at a cut below Gap quality and price. After a year, however, managers found that the Gap connection was confusing customers and cannibalizing the core brandrsquo;s image. In response, they renamed the new stores Old Navy Clothing Company—a brand that has become enormously successful in its own right.

New brands, however, are not easy to introduce. First, creating a new brand—building awareness, establishing perceptions of identity and quality, and developing a customer base—is expensive, often prohibitively so. Even IBM, with its considerable resources, failed in its effort to establish the Ambra, a relatively inexpensive personal computer that was sourced in Asia and marketed between 1992 and 1994 by mail order in Europe and the United States. Competing on price with Dell, Gateway, and other IBM models, the Ambra could not maintain a price that was low enough to compensate for its lack of brand equity. Second, new brands fac

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