《人性论》外文翻译资料

A Treatise of Human Nature

David Hume

Section 3iii: The influencing motive of the will

Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the battle between passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are virtuous only to the extent that they conform themselves to reasonrsquo;s dictates. Every rational creature, it is said, ought to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or drive tries to take control, he ought to oppose it until it is either entirely subdued or at least made to conform to the superior drive, reason. Most moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be based on this way of thinking. This supposed pre-eminence of reason over passion provides a rich source of bull;metaphysical arguments as well as of bull;moral harangues, in which reasonrsquo;s eternity, unchangingness, and divine origin are held up for admiration, while the passionsrsquo; blindness, inconstancy, and deceitfulness are equally strongly emphasized. Wanting to show the fallacy of this entire line of thought, I shall try to show bull;that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, and bull;that reason can never oppose passion in directing the will.

The understanding [here = lsquo;the faculty of reasonrsquo;] goes to work in two different ways: (1) reaching judgments through demonstration, attending only to the abstract relations of our ideas, and (2) reaching them on the basis of probability, attending to the relations of objects that we can know about only from experience. I hardly think anyone will contend that (1) the demonstrative species of reasoning is ever, on its own, the cause of any action. That kind of reasoning belongs in the world of bull;ideas, while the will deals on with the world of bull;realities; so it seems that demonstration and volition are totally removed from each other. Itrsquo;s true that mathematics [here = lsquo;geometryrsquo;?] is useful in all mechanical operations, and arithmetic is useful in almost every art and profession; but they donrsquo;t have any influence by themselves. Mechanics is the art of regulating the movements of bodies for some purpose; and our only reason for using arithmetic in fixing the proportions of numbers is to help us discover the proportions of the influence and operations of bodies. . . . Abstract or demonstrative reasoning never influences any of our actions except by directing our judgment concerning causes and effects. That brings me to the second operation of the understanding.

(2) Itrsquo;s obvious that when we have the prospect of unpleasure or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or liking, and are led to avoid or embrace the object in question. Itrsquo;s also obvious that this emotion doesnrsquo;t stop there; rather, it makes us look in every direction so as to take in whatever objects are connected with the first one by the relation of cause

and effect. Thatrsquo;s where reasoning comes in: it looks for cause-effect connections, and the results it comes up with will affect how we subsequently act. But itrsquo;s obvious that in this case reason doesnrsquo;t provide the impulse to act but only steers it. Itrsquo;s the prospect of pleasure or unpleasure from an object that makes us want it or want to avoid it; and these feelings extend themselves to the causes and effects of the object as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. We couldnrsquo;t have the slightest interest in what causes what, if the causes and effects were indifferent to us [i.e. if we didnrsquo;t have attitudes, pro or con, towards them]. Where bull;the objects themselves donrsquo;t affect us, bull;their way of being connected canrsquo;t have any influence over us; and because reason is nothing but the discovery of how they are connected, objects canrsquo;t affect us with the help of reason.

Since unaided reason canrsquo;t (a) produce an action or give rise to a volition, I infer that it is equally incapable of (b) preventing a volition or of challenging any passion or emotion ·in its role as a producer of our conduct·. This inference is strictly valid. The only way reason could possibly

1. prevent a volition would be by pushing our passions in a different direction; but such a push, if it operated alone, would have been able (a) to produce a volition. Nothing can block or dampen the impulse of passion except a contrary impulse - ·a push in the opposite direction·; and if this contrary impulse ever comes from reason, it follows that reason must have a basic influence on the will, and must be able to cause volitions as well as block them. But if reason has no basic influence, it canrsquo;t possibly resist any drive that does have such efficacy; it canrsquo;t ever keep the mind in suspense for a moment. So it seems that the drive that opposes our passion canrsquo;t be reason (using that word in its proper sense). When we talk of the struggle lsquo;between passion and reasonrsquo;, we arenrsquo;t speaking correctly. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions; the only work it can claim to do is in serving and obeying them. [The famous first half of that sentence is verbatim Hume; he didnrsquo;t put it in bold type.] This opinion may strike you as rather extraordinary, so perhaps I should back it up by some other considerations.

A passion is just a bit of the worldrsquo;s furniture, or if you like a property or state of a bit of the worldrsquo;s furniture; therersquo;s nothing about it that would enable it to represent or be a copy of anything other than itself. When I am angry, that passion is just the state that I am in; it isnrsquo;t about anything else, any more than a reference to something else is involved in my being thirsty or sick or more than five foot tall. So my anger canrsquo;t possibly be opposed by, or contradictory to, truth and reason; because any such contradic

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《人性论》

作者：大卫.休谟

节选：卷二 第三章 第三节 影响意志的各种动机

我们在哲学，甚至是日常生活中最常讨论的就是情感和理智的斗争。我们偏爱理性，并且声称只有处在理性影响范围内的人才是一个行为端正的人。据说每一个理性的生物都应该用理智控制自己的行为；如果其他的动机或驱动力想要控制他的行为，他应该反对这些动机并且直到它完全屈服，至少也要使这些动机服从于理智这个最高原则。古往今来，大多数道德哲学似乎都以此为思想基础。理智胜于情感这个假设为形而上学的争论以及道德的长篇大论提供了丰富的来源。人们赞美理智的永恒不变和神圣来源，同样也强调情感的盲目，反复无常和虚伪。为了指出所有这个思维模式的错误之处，我将尽力证明：仅仅只有理智无法成为任何意志的动机，在指导意志方面，理智无法反对情感。

这个认知（理智体系）在两个方面起作用：（1）感性的方法是仅仅考虑我们想法中的抽象部分作出判断。（2）另一个则是基于可能性，仅考虑我们从经验中所能得知的物体之间的关系。 我相信几乎没有人会同意仅仅只靠第一方面推理的作用可以构成任何行为的动机。第一种推理是属于观念世界的，然而我们的意志却是现实世界的。这种推理让情感和意志看起来似乎是两个相距甚远的概念。实际上，这就想是在所有的机械运作中数学都是有用的，算术在每一个工艺行业中也是有用的，但这并不是由于它们本身就具有影响力。力学是一种根据某种目的来控制行为的一种艺术，然而为了帮助我们发现影响和身体的运作等因素之间的比例，我们就运用算数进行推理。抽象的或是情感性的推理并不能影响我们的行为，除非这种推理能在事件的因果范围内指导我们进行判断。这就引出了认知的第二个方面。显而易见的是，当我们能预知某种物体带给我们的开心和难过，紧接着我们就会产生一种厌恶或爱好的情绪，从而导致我们去避免那些不愉快的事物和去接受开心的事物。同样明显的是这种情绪并不会就此打住，它会影响我们的每一个方面，甚至包括事件因果范围内有关系的所有事物。为了探寻这种因果间的关系，推理就此产生。随着推理结果的变化，我们的意志行为也产生了变化。但是在这种情形下，理性并不会导致行为上的冲动，只会去控制这种冲动。通过预知物体将会带给我们的愉快或不悦的感受，我们会产生一种抗拒或接受的感觉，这些情绪会扩展到理性和经验所指的事物的原因与结果。如果我们对事物的原因与结果漠不关心，那么我们不会有兴趣去搞清楚什么是原因、什么又是结果。如果这些对象本身对我们来说没有任何影响，这些对象的联系方式也不会对我们产生任何影响。因为理性只是发现事物的联系方式，所以事物并不会因为理性的原因就对我们产生任何影响。

因为仅仅只有理性是不能产生行为和意志的，所以我推断单凭理性也无法阻碍意志，或是战胜任何情感或情绪（这些情感和情绪可以产生行为）。这个推论严格来说是正确的。理性只有从不同的方向刺激我们的情感才有可能阻碍我们的意志，但是单凭这种情感刺激也可以产生意志。除了反向刺激，没有什么可以阻碍或削弱情感的冲动。如果这种反方向的冲动是来源于理性，那么理性对于意志一定会有种最根本的影响，并且可以产生或是阻碍意志。但是如果理性没有这种根本的影响，那么理性便不能抗拒任何有效的驱动力，或是让我们的思维有片刻的休息。所以反对我们情感的那个驱动力不可能是理性。当我们谈到理智与情感间的斗争时，我们并不能正确的进行说明。理智是，也应该是情感的奴隶。理智唯一的作用就是服务或者服从于情感。这个看法或许会令人感到十分惊讶，所以我们也许可以从其他的一些考虑中进行证明。

情感就是存在于世界的一种基本物质，或者也可以说是一种基本物质的某一部分，但这并不意味着它可以表现为任何一种物质的复本。当我愤怒时，这只是表明我当时具有这个情绪，但是这与其他事物并无联系，也并不意味着我因为有这种情绪就会产生其他情况，比如口渴、生病或是有五尺高。因此我的情感不能被真理和理智所反对，或是产生矛盾。因为这些矛盾都意味着物质本体和其表现的观念不符。值得一提的是，我的情感并不代表任何事物。

情感只有在伴随着判断或看法的情况下才可以与理智产生矛盾。所以情感只有在两种意义下才能被称为是“不合理”：（1）当一个不存在的物质被假定为存在的状态，在此基础上产生的情感（希望、害怕、内疚、开心、绝望、安全感）即为不合理。（2）当行为是以情感为基础，人们因为对因果做了错误的判断，所选择的方法并不能达成他们所期望的目标。这时，我们就将这种情感定义为不合理。如果情感不是以错的理念为基础，也不选择无法达成目标的不合适的手段，那么认知（理智体系）就无法加以辩护和谴责。宁愿破坏世界也不愿抓伤自己的手指，这并非有悖于理性。宁愿自我毁灭，也不愿阻止一个陌生人产生不悦的感受，这对我来说也并非是有悖于理性。当我对Y有强烈的偏好，但我依然选择了X而不是Y时，这也并不是有悖于理性。

当在某个特定的情况下，一个微小的物质比起那些更棒、更珍贵的物质能让人产生更愉悦的感受时，那么这个微小的物质就是最好的。正如同在力学中可以看到因为用了对的方法，所以人们可以举起100磅重的东西就像举起一磅重的物体一样。简而言之，不合理的情感必定是伴随着错误的判断，严格来说，我们甚至可以认为不合理的并非是情感，而是判断。

不用严格的哲学眼光来检验事物的人会自然地认为，那些感觉上一样的思维活动并没有区别。理性并不产生任何明显的情绪（包括愉快或不悦）。所以就产生了一种误解：人们会把在稳定宁静的环境中产生的思想行为与仅靠物体外表就做出评价的人的理性相混淆。虽然一些平静的欲望和趋向的确可以定义为是情感，但它们在头脑中只能产生极少的情绪，并且这些情绪多半是从人们感受到的结果而被认知。这些欲望分为两种：（1）我们生来就具有的本能，如仁慈和厌恶，对生命的热爱，对孩童的善良。（2）对美好的向往和对邪恶的憎恶。当这些情感处于平静的状态，并且不会扰乱我们的灵魂，这些情感便什么容易被误解为理性的决定。（举例来说，一个人被某个权威的机构告知他应该对孩子善良，于是他就努力这么去做了。）因为这些平静的欲望和理性被认为有相同的本质和同样的作用方式，所以人们会这两者给人带来的感受并未有很大的区别。

除了这些常常决定人们意志的情感外，还有一种隶属于同种类的猛烈情绪常常对我们的理智体系造成巨大影响。当某些人伤害我们时，我们通常会产生一种猛烈的憎恶感，希望这个人能受到伤害和惩罚，这时我们的情绪完全脱离了任何快乐的想法和自身利益。（举个例子，当我染上某种可怕的疾病，我的害怕、不安、和憎恶的感觉会达到一个高度，从而产生一种我能感受到的情绪。）

哲学家们最常见的错误就是认为这些原则之一能完全指导意志，并且假设另一个原则对意志不构成任何影响。证据显示平静的情感并不是唯一的影响因素：人们往往会做出有悖于自己利益的行为，这也就意味着所谓的最大利益的观点并不总是会影响人们。证据也显示猛烈的情感同样不会是唯一的影响因素：人们往往为了自己的利益和目标而抑制猛烈的情感，所以他们不会仅凭当时的不快就做出决定。事实是这两个原则都会影响意志，当这两个原则相反时，人们根据自己的性格和当时的心情来决定谁更占上风。我们所说的意志坚强指的就是这个人的平静情感能战胜猛烈情感。虽然我们都知道没有人可以长期保持这种美德让他永不屈服于强烈的情感和欲望。由于这些多样的性情，我们很难在动机与情感发生矛盾时断定人们的行为与决心。

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