欧洲的公共养老与私人养老外文翻译资料

Public versus private old-age pensions in Europe

The modern idea of a lsquo;welfare statersquo; constitutes one of the most important achievements of European political thought. Old-age pensions, in turn, are a crucial feature of a modern welfare state and a modern social market economy. Pensions are the main tool to provide citizens, on a large-scale basis, with acceptable welfare levels at retirement.

In the face of this, demographic trends initiated in the past and now showing major effects are casting serious doubts on the future sustainability of national pension systems as they are organized today. Countries worldwide are dealing with increasing budgetary problems in paying out pensions due to population ageing and, especially in Europe, to a historical tendency towards early retirement. Awareness of this phenomenon has triggered a widespread debate in all Member States of the European Union and throughout the world about reforming national pensions systems. Currently , almost every OECD country and EU Member State is debating the pension problem and undertaking its own reforms.

However, pension system reform is a lsquo;sensitive targetrsquo;, because of the very nature and importance of pensions. There are economic, demographic, social and political aspects that must be considered. Furthermore, from a technical point of view, there is controversy about the empirical magnitude of the pension problem and the underlying economic theory and, consequently, about best practices and policy advice for national governments. It is, therefore, no surprise that the debate on pension reform has grown intensively and now spans a variety of dimensions: from identifying appropriate actuarial formulae for computing benefits at retirement, to the general economic impact of different pension designs, to the more political issues of social consensus and implementation.

What is a pension scheme?

A pension is a contract under which an individual acquires the right to be transferred quotas of future output (the benefits) in exchange for quotas of his current output (the contributions). The contract establishes a point in time—retirement age—when this transfer starts.

In principle, an individual could lsquo;sign a contract with himselfrsquo;; that is, he could store part of his own current production for future use. However, this is not viable for services and non-storable goods, for example health care and services for the elderly, clothing and food; these are precisely the basic kinds of good and services one is interested in after retirement.

In face of this physical constraint on individual actions, modern societies have coordinated individual pension contracts into a pension system, where individuals do not need to consume their own past production during their retirement time, but instead, consume output produced by the individuals working actively during that time. Every modern pension system constitutes essentially a transfer of output, in each period, from the current young generation—meaning here as those actively working—to the current old generation—those who are retired.

Pension systems fall theoretically into two broad categories.

In a pay-as-you-go system (PAYG), the current young generation contributes mandatory to the pension system through labor income taxes, whose revenues are partly transferred to the current old generation as pension benefits. In doing so, the young generation acquires the right to receive pension benefits when they grow old.

In a funded pension system, the members of the current young generation mandatory contribute part of their labor income to a pension fund, which invests in financial assets. When they retire, the fund pays out pension benefits in the form of lifetime annuities, which finance the pensionersrsquo; consumption of goods and services produced by the current young generation.

Demographic change and public pension imbalances

This section discusses the problem of the current fiscal sustainability of public pension systems. A PAYG system is fiscally sustainable, or financially balanced, when in each period, the total nominal contributions—given as the contribution rate times the average wage times the number of workers—equal the total pension expenses—given as the average pension times the number of pensioners.

In OECD countries, public spending for retirement pensions—that is, the right-hand side of the balancing formula—is expected to rise dramatically in the coming decades. Recent projections for the period 2000–2050 show that public age-related expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, may rise on average by about seven points. In particular, the proportion of GDP represented by public spending for retirement pension and early-retirement programmers is projected to increase by almost 10% in Norway, by 8% in Spain and Korea ,by 5% in Germany and by almost 4% in France.

For the European Union, ECOFIN projects an increase of the gross (before taxes) public spending in pensions of 2.3 and 2.2 percentage points of GDP, respectively, for the EU-15 and EU-25. This implies that by 2050, the EU-15 will spend almost 13% of its GDP to finance public pensions, while the EU-25 will spend 12.8%.

The projected increase in longevity, combined with a tendency towards early retirement, is responsible for the expected increase in the expenditure for retirement pensions. At the same time, projected pension contributions are expected to fall because of the decreasing fertility rates. Indeed, lower fertility rates tend to lead to a decrease in the working population and, under reasonable assumptions about productivity, to only a moderate expansion of GDP. As a result, given the current public pension formulae, the system will experience serious fiscal imbalances.

Public versus private pension schemes

This section discusses how increasing

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欧洲的公共养老与私人养老

“福利国家”这个现代理念构成了欧洲政治思想的最重要的成就之一。养老，反过来，是现代福利国家和现代社会市场经济的重要特征。养老金是提供给公民的主要工具，在大规模的基础上，在退休时可接受的福利水平。

面对这个情况，过去和现在的人口发展趋势显示了人们对成现今国家养老制度未来的可持续发展表示严重怀疑。世界各国正在处理增加预算发放养老金的问题，由于人口老龄化，特别是在欧洲，提前退休是一个历史趋势。这一现象的认识引发了所有欧洲联盟成员国和整个世界关于国家养老系统改革的广泛讨论。目前，几乎每一个经合组织国家和欧盟成员国都在讨论养老问题，并开展其自己的改革。

然而，养老制度改革是一个“敏感对象”，因为养老金的性质和重要性。经济，人口，社会和政治方面是必须考虑的。此外，从技术角度来看，有关养老金的重要的经验和潜在的经济理论是有争议的，因此，各国政府都有自己的最佳做法和政策。因此，关于养老改革的争论变得更加激烈和跨越各种尺度也就不足为奇：从确定适当的办法计算养老金，整体经济影响不同养老金制度的设计，到更多的政治问题的社会共识和实施。

什么是养老金计划？

养老金是根据合同取得的个人获得的为他现在产出的配额来交换将来产出的配额的权力。从该合同规定的时间点，这个点开始转换。

原则上，个人可以“和自己签订合同”，也就是说，他可以把目前拥有的产出的部分用来存储以便将来使用。然而，这对服务和不耐储存货物是不可行的，例如医疗保健和老年服务，服装和食品；恰恰是这些基本的商品和服务，是老人在在退休后有兴趣的。

即使身体状况约束了个人的行动，现代社会已经把个人养老合同协调到养老制度中，这样在退休时个人不需要消费自己过去的生产，而是使用在养老合同那个时候个人积极工作的产出。每一个现代养老制度本质上构成了一个输出转移，即在每一时期，从现在的年轻一代到目前的老一代。

养老制度理论上分为两大类。

现收现付制，目前的年轻一代通过劳动所得税强制性地贡献到养老系统，他们的收入被部分转移到目前的老年一代作为养老福利。在这样做时，年轻一代获得在他们年老的时候领取退休金的权利。

基金养老制，目前的年轻一代强制性地贡献部分劳动收入到养老基金，投资于金融资产。当他们退休时，该基金以终身年金的形式支付养老福利，退休者消费的商品和服务的资金由目前的年轻一代产出。

人口变化和公共养老不平衡

本节讨论了目前的公共养老金制度在财政上的可持续性问题。现收现付制是一个财政上可持续的，或财政平衡，每一个时期，总的名义的捐款，等于总的养老金开支，即被给予的平均的养老金乘以领取养老金的人数。

在经合组织国家中，退休养老金的公共支出，也就是说，在右边的平衡公式，预计在未来数十年显着增加。最近的预测从2000——2050年间显示公共年龄相关性支出占国内生产总值的百分比，可能平均上升约7点。特别是，公共退休养老金和提前退休计划为代表的国内生产总值的比例预计在挪威将增加近10％，西班牙和韩国有8%,德国占5%，法国近4％。

对于欧洲联盟，欧盟财政经济部长计划总共增加公共支出占2.3%养老金和2.2%的GDP，分别为欧盟15国和欧盟25国。这意味着，到2050年，欧盟15国将花费近13％的GDP来资助公共养老金，而欧盟25国将斥资12.8％的GDP。

预计寿命的增加和提前退休的结合，是退休养老金支出预期增加的主要原因。与此同时，预计养老金捐款预计将下降，因为生育率的下降。事实上，低生育率往往导致劳动人口减少，而根据关于生产力合理的假设，只有国内生产总值的适度扩张。因此，鉴于目前的公共养老金计算公式，养老系统将出现严重的财政不平衡。

公共与私人养老金计划

本节讨论在当前老龄化存在的情况如何增加基金养老计划的作用去帮助维持财政的可持续性。还详细阐述了对私人养老金，储蓄和增长，金融市场和个人的保护去抵抗各种风险，必要时与现收现付制比较。

基金允许制度在面临的人口老龄化时保持财政上的平衡。在一个完全的基金制度中，每一个特定的一代人，把它称作一代A，在她的工作生活中建立她自己的“经济活动积累”。退休时，累积的活动转化为养老年金，它的实际价值恰好等于每个人积累的资产的价值。在人口老龄化的情况下，在“一代A”退休期间的劳动人口将减少。然而，“一代A”的每一个人已经积累了他退休前的养老基金。因此，养老系统必须计划足够的“钱”去支付A的养老金。这种说法对每一代人都是有效的，从而意味着基金养老制与现收现付制相背离，在人口老龄化的情况下仍然财政平衡。

事实上，基金制保持财政平衡并不意味着真实的养老年金在目前老龄化下保持不变。工作人口的减少意味着产值的减少。因此，当“一代A”的退休人员用他们的养老金去购买商品和服务时，可能出现供过于求，导致了通货膨胀的过程，降低了A的养老年金的实际价值。

虽然这种说法是正确的，但是有点小问题。首先，名义上基金养老制仍然保持平衡。最重要的是，金融不平衡可能导致系统崩溃。二，这个说法基本上是对经济增长。这是缺乏经济增长，由于劳动人口，从而降低实际退休金减少。但经济增长是一个普遍的问题，影响到现收现付和年金制度，以及整个经济。即使不知道是否有年金制度总是比现收现付制在预测经济增长上有效，现收现付制和年金制度在缺乏经济增长的情况下都是脆弱的，但是年金制度至少保持了财政平衡。

对私人养老金：政府监管

本节讨论金融市场监管，并确定一些具体的干预指导。本文的立场不是要求一对多监管。相反，它主张在一个方向上对现行法规的修订并解释退休金计划的特殊性质。

首先，从合同风险保护消费者是最重要的。一个正确的监管体系应该避免消费者承担“太多的风险”的情况，特别是他们经常无法实现的价值类型，而不是作为风险转移给中介机构或金融机构。

监管可能减轻私人养老金计划的两个共同方面。养老金计划的流动程度是不公平的，由于监管制度，可以被增加。一个例子就是抵押贷款合同，这在有些国家，可以在合理的成本重新谈判最近的经验。养老金计划，也可能包括重新谈判的可能性，转换基金和他们的供应商。显然，这将要求对退休金计划的标准化程度相当高。在高标准化的方向行政干预也可能有助于提高个人的养老金产品的知识，从而减少其不确定性。

总结

本文谨慎地采取了在当前的养老体系中让私营部门广泛参与的立场。本文认为这可能是一个成功的战略转型因为其提供了经过深思熟虑的政策，促进金融监管。目前不需要更多的规章，而是一个有利于修订的指导性条例。

在这里，我们要指出的是无论什么时候养老金制度都具有很强的再分配的目标。在这方面，公共部门比任何私人机构有更多的融资机会。

注：引自Filippo L. Calciano 和Mario Tirelli的《欧洲的观点》2008年第七卷第二章277—286页。

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